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1. Introduction 
Decentralization has long been seen as a major policy tool for helping to improve governance and 
the provision of public goods in the developing world.  Indeed, there are theoretical reasons to 
expect greater public accountability at lower levels of government due to competition between units 
(Seabright 1996), while some empirical evidence suggests that decentralization allows local 
governments to respond better to local needs than national governments (Faguet and Sánchez 2013), 
particularly in ethnically or religiously diverse countries where publich policy preferences can vary 
widely.  As a result decentralization has become a large trend in governmental reform across the 
world over the past few decades, in particular in low-income countries with a poor history of public 
service delivery.  Yet the potential benefits of decentralization can be outweighed by a number of 
factors, in particular by the problem of poor administrative capacity and a greater potential for elite 
capture (Bardhan 2002; Robinson 2007).  The contradictory and confusing nature of the relationship 
between decentralization and development has thus led some like Mookherjee (2015) and Treisman 
(2007) to argue that generalizing about the relationship between decentralization and government 
effectiveness is effectively impossible as it is dependent on a number of context-specific factors. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of decentralization I examine here the case study of 
Uganda, which has had major decentralization of power since its current President Yoweri 
Museveni took office in 1986.  Uganda is a good case study to examine the effects of 
decentralization inasmuch as the process by which power has been deconcentrated and devolved to 
five levels of local government has been called “one of the most far-reaching local government 
reform programs in the developing world” (Francis and James 2003, p. 325).  Indeed, 
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decentralization in Uganda not only involved the introduction of a uniform five-tiered local 
government structure but a commitment to fiscal and political decentralization as well as regular 
local government elections. 
Yet initial excitement about Uganda’s decentralization program has, however, tapered off in 
recent years in large part to continued strong ties between the ruling National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) party and local governments and a resulting lack of effectiveness in providing high quality 
public services.  The evidence presented here suggests that numerous problems with Uganda’s 
decentralization program such as a lack of funds, a lack of competent staff, corruption and an 
obsessive focus on the creation of new local government units are all responsible for the lagging 
performance of local governments.  Moreover, as seen in Mezgebe (2015) as well as the other 
chapters in this volume, evidence from other African countries suggests that Uganda is not alone in 
suffering from these problems.  The Ugandan case thus suggests that decentralization reforms 
themselves are not a panacea for broader problems of poor institutions that are endemic in 
developing countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as such.  First, I provide a brief history of decentralization 
in Uganda since the colonial period.  Second, I give an overview of decentralization reforms under 
President Museveni’s government, and then focus on how a lack of independence has led to a lack 
of effectiveness.  In the latter case I show how a lack of funding, incompetent staffing, corruption 
and rampant district creation result in poor outcomes.  Finally I conclude with broader thoughts on 
the consequence of Uganda’s decentralization failures and how they could potentially be rectified.2 
 
2. A History of Local Government in Uganda to 1986 
Under colonial rule most of Uganda was governed by a system of British district commissioners.  
Under these commissioners chiefs held powers over taxes, courts, local councils and general law 
and order.  In the eastern and northern parts of Uganda which had no tradition of kingdoms or 
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hierarchical leadership, the imposition of chiefs was alien and, while ruling under "customary" law, 
chiefs in such areas were actually closer to modern civil servants than traditional pre-colonial rulers. 
The situation was markedly different in the five kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Busoga, 
Bunyoro and Toro in the southern and western part of the country, which had a long pre-colonial 
history of political hierarchy, in some cases dating back centuries.
3
  Here the British instituted a 
system of indirect rule whereby local government retained some similarities with the pre-colonial 
era, in particular in Buganda, the largest and most powerful of the kingdoms.  In part due to greater 
local legitimacy, the Buganda kingdom clashed with the central government in the 1950s over its 
degree of political independence and eventually requested to be granted a federal status in the 
country's future constitution.  Concerns about a future civil war led the British Munster Commission 
in charge of designing the post-colonial government to recommend a federal status for Buganda but 
only recommend a semi-federal status for the other kingdoms and a unitary system for the rest of 
the country because they were not as rich or large as Buganda, thereby creating a highly unequal 
system of local governance upon independence in 1962. 
This arrangement continued for only four years after independence, in large part because the 
Buganda kingdom continued to clash with Milton Obote's national government in Kampala over its 
degree of political freedom.  This time, however, the Kampala government decided to send in 
troops rather than accede to the kingdom's demands, thereby leading to exile of the king of Buganda 
and the dissolution of all kingdoms as local government entities.  The twenty years between the 
exile of King Mutesa in 1966 and the beginning of current President Yoweri Museveni's rule in 
1986 were ones of autocratic and illegitimate local government due to the undemocratic and highly 
centralized nature of the national government.  The 1967 Constitution not only completely 
dissolved all kingdoms’ federal status but also took power away from the district assemblies and 
split the country into eighteen equal districts.  The constitution also abolished all district land 
boards, placing their power in the Uganda Land Commission (Sathyamurthy 1986, pp. 440-441).  
Indeed, as Sathyamurthy (1986, p. 445) notes, "from the beginning, Obote regarded strong local 
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governments… as obstacles in the way of forging a united Uganda according to a radical political 
philosophy." 
 
3. The Resistance Council/Local Council (RC/LC) System (1986-present): Reforms and 
Problems 
While in the bush as a rebel army fighting the Obote government in the early 1980s, Museveni's 
National Resistance Army (NRA) began to create local government cells in territory it controlled 
under the name of "Resistance Councils" (RCs).  As early as 1981 the NRA began to organize 
"clandestine committees" purely as a means for civilians to provide food and security for the rebels.  
After securing enough territory the NRA allowed the RCs to take on the responsibility of governing 
villages as well.  They did not collect taxes but instead "judged local disputes, maintained sanitary 
regulations, kept roads clear and for security purposes registered everyone…  RC chairs issued 
permits to allow a villager to travel to another village."  Kasfir (2001, pp. 20-24) notes that, 
although the RCs were overseen by the NRA, they "were given unprecedented political and 
administrative space."  Thus the RC system worked to advantage the NRA leadership by providing 
them with a semi-regular supply of resources with the willing help and enthusiasm of the local 
population.  In other words, the pre-1986 RC system functioned precisely because, in contrast to its 
later forms, it was directly important to the survival of the NRA. 
Considering the vital importance of the RC system to the NRA war effort prior to 1986, it is 
perhaps no surprise that Museveni and his ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party have 
built upon the RC system and invested much effort into completely transforming Uganda’s local 
government system since they overthrew the government in Kampala in January 1986.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to overstate how much emphasis the NRM put on the success of its local government 
program upon taking power.  The political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, who chaired the 
government-appointed 1987 Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System, wrote that 
"the RC system [was] the kernel of the agrarian revolution brought to rural Uganda by the NRM" 
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(Mamdani 1997).  The Museveni government totally altered the formerly top-down local 
government system by instituting local democratic control through an increased number of 
popularly elected posts while also making all citizens mandatory members of their local councils 
(LCs, the successor to the RCs).  Furthermore, the NRM government has not only increased the 
number of districts from an initial 39 to 112 in an attempt to thereby increase local access to 
services provided at the district level (Green 2010), but also has focused on both streamlining local 
government bureaucracy and increasing local fiscal power. 
It is therefore no surprise that the LC system initially garnered high praise from scholars, in 
particular for their ability to encourage political participation (Mutibwa 1992), detribalize rural 
administration by removing the power of local tribal chiefs (Mamdani 1996) and combat HIV/AIDS 
successfully (Allen and Heald 2004).  The initial reaction within Uganda was just as strong: as 
Golooba-Mutebi (1999, p. 112) notes, both the initial RC elections in 1987 as well as the second set 
in 1989 resulted in "massive voter turnout indicative of widespread endorsement of, and enthusiasm 
for, the system."  In his field work in the early 1990s, Karlström (1999, p. 435) also found much 
support for the RC system in rural Buganda, principally due to its similarity to the old Buganda 
local government system in that both systems encourages local control of local politics.
4
  However, 
there is evidence that the quality of local government institutions is not necessarily lower in non-
kingdom areas (Bandyopadhyay and Green 2016), which suggests that the Museveni government 
has been able to implement decentralization evenly across Uganda.  In other words, the NRM was 
successful in making the LC system both democratic and legitimate, inasmuch as the system 
enjoyed large amounts of popular support across the whole country. 
Yet, by the end of the 1990s, the faults of the LC system began to be increasingly clear.  As 
Golooba-Mutebi (1999, p. 149) writes, "much of the applause heaped on the RC system in its 
juvenile days was prematuree.  Ten years after the system had been established countrywide, it had 
begun to show signs of atrophy and possible terminal decline."  More recently it has become 
obvious that the Museveni government's main interest in the LC system has not been to provide 
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good public services but instead to maintain the ruling NRM’s network of power at the local level, 
especially after electoral party politics was legalized again in 2005 (Gubser 2011; Tripp 2010).  
Indeed, the LC system has never been neither truly effective nor independent, inasmuch as the 
result of much of the government’s attempts to create local power centers at the district level has 
inevitably resulted in both ineffective government and a lack of independence.  These problems 
have meant that, while still better than local government under Obote and Amin, the LC system has 
not fulfilled its initial expectations.  I therefore first examine the LC system as it has developed 
since the 1980s before examining its two key problems in turn. 
 
3.1. The Evolution of the RC System (1986-present) 
Upon establishing itself in Kampala in 1986, the NRM government spread the RC system 
throughout the country.  Due to their democratic nature RCs were "greeted with enthusiasm," 
winning the "confidence of members of the public… in most areas of the country" (Golooba-Mutebi 
1999, pp. 105, 109).  The system became institutionalized with the implementation of the Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System in 1987, which resulted a five-tier 
structure that consisted of the village (RCI), parish (RCII), sub-county (RCIII), county (RCIV) and 
district (RCV) with the additional offices of District Administrator (appointed by the President) and 
District Executive Secretary (appointed by the Minister of Local Government) at the district level. 
However, the NRM government continued to reform and adjust the local government 
system.  The early 1990s saw the introduction of partial financial decentralization alongside the 
transference of power from central government representatives to the elected members of the 
district.  Moreover, local governments were supported by three types of grants from the central 
government, namely unconditional grants (largely for the purposes of government salaries),
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conditional grants (for specific projects) and equalization grants (for underprivileged districts) 
(1995 Constitution of Uganda, Chapter 11, Clause 193).
6
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Further reforms came in with the 1995 constitution which renamed RCs as Local Councils 
(LCs) and mandated direct elections at all levels of local government, including that of the district 
chairman, every four years.  The Chairperson and Speaker of the district were now to function 
largely like the President and Speaker at the national level, while District Service Commissions 
were to function like the Public Service Commission at the nation level in that they hold the power 
to appoint, discipline and remove district officers.  The constitution also mandated that 1/3 of the all 
LC members must be women and that the district chairman must be between 30 and 75 years old 
(1995 Constitution of Uganda, Chapter 11, clauses 176-206). 
As regards finances the Local Government Act of 1997 formalized the distribution of 
district revenue to be allocated to the various LC levels.  The sub-county (LCIII) would collect 
revenue and give 35% to the district (LCV).  Of the money kept by the sub-county the county 
(LCIV) and parish (LCII) each received 5% and villages (LCI) received 25%, thereby leaving the 
sub-county with the other 65%.
7
  Thus by the late 2000s some 31.1% of all government revenue 
was spent by local governments, up from 19.8% in 1998 (Lindemann 2011, p. 407). 
 
3.2. Problems with the LC system 
While these reforms have somewhat succeeded in creating democratic and legitimate local 
governments, they have not, however, resulted in an independent or effective system of local 
government.  Instead, the effects of decentralization have been to devolve the power of the central 
government to the district level rather than to the lower levels of local government.  The first 
problem stems from the NRM’s attempts to maintain strict control over the LC system, which has 
been manifested by its reliance on both central government appointed positions, and local NRM 
apparatchiks.  The result has been that the LC system has suffered from various problems such as a 
lack of funds, a lack of competent staff, local corruption and the creation of new districts.  I 
examine each of these four problems in turn. 
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Lack of Independence 
As has been well documented in other developing countries such as Bolivia, Indonesia and Senegal, 
national governments which pursued decentralization policies have also been reluctant to allow true 
local government independence that would involve any loss of power at the national level and have 
thus tended to "recentralize" power in the capital (Ribot et al. 2006).  Some scholars have claimed 
that Uganda’s decentralization program is unusual in the way in which the central government 
"pursued a preference for local political empowerment from the beginning so as to build its own 
legitimacy" (Awortwi 2011, p. 365; cf. Furley 2000; Steffensen and Trollegaard 2000).  However, 
others like Lambright (2011), Lewis (2014) and Tripp (2010) claim that Uganda is actually closer to 
the norm in the numerous ways in which decentralization has been instrumentalized by the ruling 
NRM government.  Indeed, Kampala’s control over local governments is perhaps the greatest 
problem for the LC system, since it has meant that the system is less a check on the power of the 
central government than an extension of its control into local areas.  The NRM has granted itself a 
variety of ways in which to exercise its power at the district level, including a clause in the 1995 
constitution giving the President the right to take over a district government in exceptional 
circumstances (1995 Constitution of Uganda, Chapter 11, clause 202).
8
  However, most of the time 
the NRM has maintained its control through three ways, namely through the two posts of the 
Resident District Commissioner and the Chief Administrative Officer at the district level, through 
the Ministry of Local Government, and through the top-down structure of the NRM itself. 
In its attempts to control the district governments, the NRM created two posts responsible to 
the central government.  The first, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), is the chief technical 
administrator in the district and, along with the deputy CAO, is both appointed by and responsible 
to the Minister of Local Government (henceforth MoLG).  While the 1993 Local Government Act 
made the CAO nominally responsible to the district government, this right was revoked in a 
constitutional amendment in 2005 despite opposition from donors, the Uganda Local Government 
Association and the 2003 Constitutional Review Commission, among others.  The result has been 
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that CAOs are now transferred from one district to another on a regular basis and thus permanently 
base themselves and their family in Kampala and work as visitors to their assigned districts, with a 
resultant decline in oversight over local personnel (Nabaho 2013, p. 206).  It is of course no 
coincidence that the recentralization of control over CAOs took place at the same time when 
Uganda returned to a multi-party democracy and President Museveni was concerned about the 
infiltration of opposition parties into the local government structure, as seen by the decision to force 
all CAOs to undergo military and ideological training for one month in 2009 (Awortwi 2011, p. 
369). 
The second position, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC), is appointed by and 
responsible to the President and co-ordinates future planning through the District Development 
Committee while also monitoring and overseeing local government programs more generally.  
Indeed, the strategy of the NRM in moving RDCs around the country like foreign diplomats, with 
only a couple of years at their post before assuming a new position, has prevented the RDCs from 
identifying with local concerns against those of the central government.  This was quite obvious in 
the case of Protaz Tigurihwayo, the RDC for Masaka when I visited in December 2001 and a 
Munyankole from Bushenyi district who had never before served as RDC.  Tigurihwayo’s main 
complaint about the local government system was that his hands were tied by both the district 
chairpeople, whom he claimed had too much power, and by district technocrats, whom he claimed 
should be appointed by the central government rather than by the district government (Interview 
with Protaz Tigurihwayo, Masaka, 13/12/2001).
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Thus the RDCs have acted largely as central government representatives, especially around 
election time.  In the 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary elections the International Foundation for 
Election Systems noted that RDCs "played a partisan role" (Green 2008, pp. 437-438).  Similarly, 
in the context of the 2004 debate about President Museveni’s potential third term, the RDCs were 
accused by MPs of serving as NRM apparatchiks, going so far as to bar "anti-Movement MPs from 
holding meetings" (New Vision 14/8/2004).  While this pro-Movement activity has failed to come 
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under criticism from the MoLG, it has not refrained from rebuking CAOs or RDCs for "engaging in 
politics and issuing political statements" when they criticize the central government, as in the case 
where the Sironko district CAO blamed President Museveni for a shortfall in local revenue (New 
Vision 14/8/2004).  As such local councilors are loath to criticize the Museveni or the ruling NRM 
party in public – with the sole exception of the capital city of Kampala, whose residents consistently 
elect DP mayors.  As in other countries with a strong opposition presence in the capital, however, 
the Museveni government has dealt with this problem by recentralizing power in Kampala, 
specifically via the creation of the Kampala Capital City Authority in 2010. 
 
Lack of Effectiveness 
The result of central government oversight over both CAOs and RDCs has meant that, according to 
one delegate to the Constituent Assembly tasked to debate Uganda's new constitution in the mid-
1990s, "decentralization means that powerful district leaders are assigned instead of being elected 
from within" (Constituent Assembly Proceedings 6/7/1994, p. 624).  The priority given by the 
central government to political control over local governments as compared to publish goods 
provision has inevitably meant that much of the initial gains associated with decentralization 
reforms in the 1990s have not been matched in recent years (Lambright 2012, p. 2).  For instance, 
the most impressive feat of Uganda’s decentralization policy has been the gains in universal 
primary education, which saw dramatic increase in net enrolment ratios after school fees were 
abolished for up to four children per household in 1997 from 57% in 1996 to 85% in 2000 and 97% 
in 2007 (Bashaasha, Mangheni and Nkonya 2011, p. 8).  However, while the implementation of 
universal primary education was conducted by local governments, the initiative behind it was 
clearly directed from Kampala in a very top-down manner (Stasavage 2004; Wunsch 2008).  
Moreover, the success in raising enrolment has not been matched by raising the number of schools 
or teachers, which led to declining teacher qualifications and questions about a deterioration in the 
quality of primary education (Bashaasha et al. 2011; Nishimura, Yamano and Sasaoka 2008), with 
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similar concerns about the implementation of universal secondary education from 2006 onwards 
(Chapman, Burton and Werner 2010). 
The health sector has also been decentralized, with a District Director of Health Services 
leading a district health team while hospital management boards are appointed by local councils.  
However, as with education there is little evidence that decentralization is responsible for whatever 
improvements have occurred in Uganda’s health sector (Bashaasha et al. 2011).  For instance, 
Pariyo et al. (2009) suggest that health care initiatives "were not based on locally generated ideas, 
objective assessments of the existing situations, or local adaptation of interventions tried elsewhere, 
but on pre-packaged interventions designed by donor agencies."  They suggest that decentralization 
has led to increased access to health facilities but no noticeable change in infant or maternal 
mortality rates, which could in part be due to a decline in income to health workers (Kyaddondo and 
Whyte 2003). 
Assessing the impact of decentralization is in many ways a bit difficult in Uganda, as 
decentralization has not been implemented suddenly across the country in the same way at the same 
time as for instance in Bolivia (Faguet 2004), thereby allowing for a clear before-and-after story.  
Indeed, much of the literature on decentralization has similarly noted the difficulty in assessing the 
outcomes of decentralization (Mookherjee 2015; Treisman 2007), not just because of the gradual 
process by which decentralization is usually introduced but also because its implementation cannot 
be separated from the political incentives which drive decentralization policies.  However, one way 
to assess the impact of decentralization on service delivery in Uganda is to examine the effect of 
district creation, whereby new districts have been created out of older districts on a semi-regular 
basis every few years since the early 1990s.  Not only does the 1995 Ugandan constitution allow for 
district creation for the purposes of "bringing services closer to the people," local government 
officials have long claimed that district creation have will bring better public services (Green 2010).  
Moreover, there is evidence that the Ugandan government has created new districts out of counties 
that are both politically and economically deprived relative to their "mother" districts (Grossman 
12 
 
and Lewis 2014).  However, there remains no evidence that district creation leads to better public 
services in Uganda, whereby changes in UNDP district-level measures of poverty between 1996 
and 2003 are not correlated with the creation of new districts in 1997 (Green 2010).  None of this is 
particularly surprising, of course, since there is strong evidence that district creation has been driven 
by electoral calculations rather than developmental needs (Green 2010). 
Indeed, decentralization has in many ways failed to be as effective as was initially expected, 
thereby leading many older Ugandans to have "nostalgic feelings" about the "old system of local 
administration… when local amenities and infrastructure were relatively well maintained" 
(Golooba-Mutebi 1999, pp. 126-127).  In recent years the percentages of districts meeting the 
minimum performance standards set by the central government has fallen to only 34% in 2008 from 
80% a few years before (Klaver and Tibamwenda 2009).  As such, in the 2011 presidential election 
President Museveni went so far as to distance himself from local government leaders and blame 
them for poor government performance (Izama and Wilkerson 2011, p. 67).  More generally, the 
LC system has failed to be effective for four reasons, namely a lack of funding, a lack of competent 
staff, local corruption and an obsession with district creation, each of which I examine in turn. 
 
Funding 
One of the key differences between federal and decentralized political systems is that the former 
devolve significant revenue-raising powers while the latter do not.  Indeed, sub-national tax 
revenues average only 16.6% in developing countries, inasmuch as central governments prefer to 
hold onto major sources of revenue for themselves and devolve very limited control over taxation to 
local governments (Shaw and Thompson 2004).  Uganda is no different in this sense: up until 2005 
the vast majority of local revenue – 84% at the district level – came from graduated personal tax 
(GPT), of which only 45% of its actual potential was collected at the district level (and only 27% at 
the village level).  The GPT was a very regressive tax, with an upper limit of 80,000 Ush and an 
"extremely arbitrary" system of assessing household income.
10
  Furthermore, collection costs went 
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as high as 30% of GPT revenue,
11
 much of which was felt by locals to "to cover the wages and 
allowances of the tax collector or of civil servants at district headquarters rather than being applied 
to tangible projects likely to benefit the poor" (Livingstone and Charlton 1998, pp. 507, 513).  
Indeed, in 2003 "surveys from Mubende and Soroti districts indicated that transporting the officials 
and policemen to round up defaulters is more expensive than the [GPT] money realized" (New 
Vision 3/9/2003). 
The unpopularity of the GPT led to a "reluctance to collect taxes" on the part of local 
governments, which in turn led to a collection rate of only 60% of adults over 18 in 2002 
(Government of Uganda 2002, pp. 4, 28).  As a result the government eliminated the GPT 
altogether in late 2005 in the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections.  The result, however, has 
been that local government have become even more reliant upon the central government for 95% of 
their budget (New Vision, 4/7/2010).  In an attempt to replace the GPT with new sources of local 
revenue the government created two new local taxes in 2008: first, a local hotel tax charged 
between 1000 and 3500 Ugandan Shillings (Ush) per room per day depending on the quality of the 
hotel, and second, a local service tax on employees ranging between 5,000 and 100,000 Ush per 
year (Bashaasha, et al., 2011, p. 4).  However, so far neither tax has produced much revenue for 
local governments, which have collected an average of 6 billion Ush per year compared to 80 
billion which they used to collect with GPT (New Vision, 3/7/2012).  Indeed, as numerous LC 
officials have noted, the hotel tax is useless in the large number of sub-counties in rural Uganda 
with no hotels, while many districts also fail to have "farmers with the required acreage of land and 
number of cattle to meet the local service tax requirements" according to Kabale district chairman 
Adson Kakuru (New Vision, 25/6/2008). 
As a result local governments in Uganda continue to rely heavily upon central government 
funding which, however, has had two significant problems.  The first problem is that central 
government funding for local governments has been neither reliable nor adequate.  Indeed, in an 
effort to reduce Uganda’s budget deficit, the NRM government cut local government funding from 
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25% of the national budget in 2005/06 to only 17.6% in 2011/12 (New Vision, 24/8/2012).  In 
particular poor districts, especially those in the north, have not seen as much assistance from 
equalization grants as they should have expected, which is a consequence of the fact that 
equalization grants comprise only 0.5% of central government funding to districts (Bitarabeho 
2008). 
The second problem is that the result of this shortage of funds has been the accumulation of 
what money does exist at the district level.  Various studies have confirmed this concentration of 
funds at the district level (cf. Green 2008).  For instance, a Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) 
survey of nine districts in 2002 noted that "there is hardly any officer in charge of education in all 
the sub-counties visited…  This is because this function is entirely being performed by the district."  
The same applied to health services: "at the sub-county level, health services are almost entirely 
being performed by the higher local government."  Furthermore, while the percentage of taxes 
collected by the sub-counties required by law to be given to the district did reach its source, the 
reverse was not true: "the revenues collected by the districts… [are] never shared with the sub-
counties" (Government of Uganda 2002, pp. 24-25, 33-34). 
 
Incompetent Staff 
By devolving responsibilities for public services to local governments without significant assistance 
from the central government, decentralization can often lead to pressures on staff not well-equipped 
to handle their new remit.  Indeed, the literature on decentralization in other African countries such 
as Tanzania and Zambia suggests that decentralization can result in both recruitment problems and 
the retention of under-qualified and unqualified staff (Hampwaye 2008, Munga et al. 2009).  Not 
surprisingly, the same problem has arisen in Uganda, where the MoLG has also noted that local 
government staff members are often incompetent and uneducated.  In particular many local 
councilors do not fully comprehend the tasks they are supposed to perform: in a 2002 study the 
MoLG found that only 25% and 30% of local councilors clearly understood their mandates in the 
15 
 
areas of education and health, respectively.  The most obvious reasons for this include the fact that 
"the books containing the legal framework are unavailable in many local governments" while, when 
the books are available, "some terms are very difficult to understand" (Government of Uganda 
2002, pp. 39-40). 
Needless to say, the aforementioned rapid expansion in the number of districts has only 
exacerbated this problem.  Indeed, not only do some older districts lose crucial staff to newer 
districts which can afford to pay higher salaries, but new districts in poor or undesireable locations 
often have staffing levels as low as 9% according to a 2012 government report (Government of 
Uganda 2012, p. 17).  The result is that many local government staff members take on additional 
jobs: in 2013, for instance, some 30% of all “District Water Officers also doubled as the District 
Engineers with excessive workload that affected effectiveness of the two offices” (Government of 
Uganda 2015, p. 3). 
 In the author’s own experiences local government staff members were poorly trained in a 
variety of ways.  For instance, in Kiboga district a 20-year old VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas, a 
British NGO) volunteer from Canada was assigned to help the district staff on IT matters.  He had 
the bright idea of grouping the district staff’s computers in one room so that if one of them had 
queries about how to operate their computer they could easily ask others without having to shout for 
the VSO’s help.  Yet even so the VSO was bombarded with questions, many of which involved 
turning the computer and/or printer on or off. 
 Furthermore, many district officials around the country have been caught in scandals as 
regards to their lack of O-levels (an academic qualification equivalent to the GCSE in the UK), the 
academic minimum for holding a district-level post.  Needless to say, this bare minimum 
requirement would explain why even those with O-levels were unable to understand their tasks 
and/or mandates, as outlined above, not to mention those at lower levels of government where the 
requirement is less or non-existent.
12
  For instance, many district councilors, not to mention those 
further down, cannot speak English (Manyak and Katono 2010, p. 11),
13
 while "some councilors 
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who head departments are unable to present reports from their departments and hire literate people 
to read out the reports for them," according to an MP from Mukono district (New Vision 26/7/2003). 
 
Corruption 
One of the main arguments for decentralization is that it lowers corruption at the national level, 
potentially via the way competition between governmental units can incentivize better public 
accountability.  However, there is also reason to believe that checks and balances on public servants 
decline with decentralization, and that the complex nature of political systems with multiple tiers of 
government leads to uncoordinated rent-seeking (Fan et al. 2009).  Uganda clearly seems to fit the 
latter case, inasmuch as "the issue of corruption at local government level over money sent from the 
centre is really enormous," according to MP and member of the Parliamentary Local Government 
Accounts Committee Betty Amongi (Women, Apac) (Online Parliament of Uganda Hansard, 
15/5/2003).  Indeed, one noted study of local government spending on nonwage education 
expenditures in the early 1990s found that only an average of 13% of the actual grant sent by the 
central government reached the relevant primary schools, with the rest of the money siphoned off 
by local officials and politicians (Reinikka and Svensson 2004).  Moreover, survey evidence 
suggests that Ugandans find local officials more corrupt than central government officials or the 
police, with corruption increasing as one moves upwards from the village level to the district 
(Deininger and Mpuga 2005, p. 178; Lambright 2011, p. 1). 
Perhaps here it is best to take the example of one district visited by the author, namely 
Kiboga in north-west Buganda, to see how much corruption takes place at the district level alone.  
Indeed, financial mismanagement has plagued Kiboga ever since it was created out of Mubende 
district in the early 1990s.  In 1994 the district Secretary for Women was accused of embezzling 
more than 21m shillings before fleeing the district.  In 1998 the district government directed the 
CAO of Kiboga to suspend the district’s Chief Finance Officer and Assistant Salary Officer for 
"financial mismanagement, abuse of office and inefficiency in their services, which caused great 
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loss to the district" (New Vision 12/9/1998; New Vision 11/5/1999), while two sub-county chiefs 
and four cashiers were indicted by the CAO for failing to account for 16m Ush.  Finally, in 2003 the 
CAO himself came under fire for failing to explain why the district government spent 1.38 billion 
Ush in excess of its budget, whereas the district’s personnel and salary officers and District Service 
Commission Secretary were arrested in August 2003 for payroll fraud in connection with "ghost" 
primary school teachers (Monitor 31/1/2004; New Vision 18/8/2003; New Vision 20/8/2003). 
Similar accusations were launched at Kiboga district chairman Siraje Kizito.  In 2002 the 
RDC for Kiboga ordered an inquiry into more than 200m shillings meant for classroom 
construction that had gone missing; Kiboga Woman MP and State Minister for Defence Ruth 
Nankabirwa claimed that Kizito had embezzled the money.  Kizito was also accused of nepotism 
and "immaturity" during his first term by the District Service Commission chairman and a local 
magistrate, respectively (Monitor 15/9/2000).  He was nonetheless re-elected in February 2002, 
only to be accused again by Nankabirwa of having more than 80% of his votes coming from outside 
Kiboga.  In a subsequent trial in Kampala, Kizito's former opponent accused him of giving and 
promising piglets to voters in return for votes; as a result, the High Court declared the LCV seat 
vacant and called for another election in July 2002.  The matter was eventually resolved when the 
Court of Appeal upheld the election in a unanimous decision, claiming that the electoral 
irregularities were not large enough to affect the result (New Vision 29/10/2002).  However, election 
irregularities again plagued Kiboga in September 2010, when some local officials claimed that 
armed men attempted to intimidate and bribe voters to vote against Kizito (New Vision 25/10/2010). 
 
New District Creation 
Numerous governments in the developing world have created new local governmental units in the 
past two decades, largely for political reasons as governments seek to consolidate their electoral 
support.  However, while evidence suggests that an increase in the number of units may lead to 
better public services in countries with a small initial number of governmental units, for those 
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countries which already possess a large number of governmental units further increases in their 
numbers result in a declining quality of public services (Grossman and Pierskalla 2014). 
Again we find Uganda to be a prime example of this phenomenon under President 
Museveni's rule.  Museveni was not the first Ugandan president to undertake this task, as in 1974 
Idi Amin introduced ten provincial governments and almost doubled the number of districts from 19 
to 37 in a clear example of the prebendalistic practices common to Africa at the time (Van de Walle 
2007).  As with Amin district creation has created patronage opportunities for Museveni which has 
paid off in numerous recent elections (Green 2010).  However, unlike Amin Museveni’s 
government has continued to add districts in regular intervals to the point where it now has 112 
districts (cf. Table 1), or more highest-level local government units than any other country in the 
world. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
As noted by Green (2010), several government officials have claimed that district creation 
has helped service delivery in such areas as boreholes, schools, and roads.  However, he finds no 
correlation between the creation of new districts and improved service delivery.  In fact, the 
creation of new districts has led to several problems of its own.  First, the creation of new districts 
has led to severe funding problems across Uganda.  As noted by the President and Secretary–
General of the Uganda Local Governments Association, new districts are often created with 
severely inadequate staffing, with human resource levels at 55% on average of their full capacity 
and as low as 10% in many districts (New Vision, 24/8/2012).  Delays in setting up new district 
offices often mean that it is difficult to establish where responsibilities lie, as established by 
Kyaddondo and Whyte (2003) in the case of Tororo and Busia districts in eastern Uganda. 
Second, district creation has meant that central government funding allocated at the district 
level has been spread increasingly thin.  For instance, the central government equalization fund 
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budget has remained at the same level of 3.4 billion Ush for a number of years while the number of 
recipient districts has increased by 400%.  While the central government has responded to 
budgetary concerns by eliminating County (LCIV) councils, which cost 17.5 billion Ush per year, 
the collective savings is so small that it effectively only helps to cover the shortfall in revenue for 
one district, let alone all of Uganda’s 112 districts (Independent 14/7/2012). 
 
4. Conclusion 
While there is no doubt that decentralization remains incredibly popular across the world, It is 
possible that excitement about its potential as a developmental strategy may have peaked in recent 
years, as the high expectations of decentralization are not met in countries like Indonesia and South 
Africa, among others (Koelble and Siddle 2014; Pisani 2014; Wunsch 2008).  Similarly, in Uganda 
the LC system continues to suffer from numerous faults and has failed to live up to the 
aforementioned expectations of the late 1980s.  I have claimed here that the problems of the 
Ugandan decentralization program are rooted in its lack of independence from Kampala both 
politically and economically, which has contributed to such issues as a lack of competent staff, 
corruption and an obsessive focus on creating new districts for political reasons.  In other words, the 
disappointments associated with decentralization have been associated with broader problems of 
poor quality institutions that are common among young democracies in the developing world. 
The failures of decentralization in Uganda have had at least two serious consequences.  
First, in the Buganda region many residents have expressed a desire to return to a federal or regional 
system under the governance of the Buganda Kingdom – or federo as it is known locally – of the 
1960s.  Indeed, this continued support for federo within Buganda was at the heart of the Kampala 
riots of September 2009 that led to the deaths of 40 people.  The fact that the Buganda federal 
government of the 1960s was not only ineffective at providing good public services but, as noted 
above, was also a major cause of Uganda’s subsequent collapse into authoritarianism, has not 
prevented this issue from going away despite various public relations efforts over the years by the 
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central government to convince people otherwise.  Moreover, while the central government has 
created the legal structure necessary to support the existence of a sixth regional tier of local 
government (Government of Uganda 2012), nowhere else in Uganda outside Buganda is there 
strong support for such a tier, which means that any attempt to create a regional government for 
Buganda would almost inevitably lead to another uneven federal structure such as existed in the 
1960s. 
A second albeit indirect consequence of decentralization’s failures is that the Museveni 
government has stalled in its developmental efforts.  Uganda’s relative ranking in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) has actually dropped in recent years from the 84
th
 percentile in 2003 
(147 out of 175 countries) and 82
nd
 percentile in 2004 (146 out of 177) to the 88
th
 percentile in 2014 
(164 out of 187), during which time countries like Angola, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Yemen have surpassed it on the annual HDI.  It would be wrong to assume that the failures of 
decentralization are the primary reason why development in Uganda has stalled relative to other 
comparable countries – at the very least an inability to lower fertility levels has played a major role 
in this respect – but the contrast between Uganda and such decentralization successes as Bolivia and 
Colombia is striking here (Faguet 2004; Faguet and Sánchez 2013). 
While the failures of decentralization have been the focus here, it is also clear that previous 
experiments with more centralized government structures under previous regimes in Uganda have 
been even worse, as noted above.  Thus it is at least possible to suggest some obvious policy 
changes which could help to alleviate some of the more serious concerns listed here.  A halt to 
creating new districts is one such policy, inasmuch as "districtization" does not appear to have had 
any significant impact on development outcomes. Second, salaries for local government need to be 
increased to increase staffing levels and improve the quality of staff, as was recommended by the 
Local Government Finance Commission in 2013 (Government of Uganda 2013, p. 12).  Third, 
allowing more latitude to political opposition at the local level by removing the links between local 
government and local NRM committees would also allow for more open political competition and 
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thereby incentivize more effective governance.  Fourth and finally, allowing for more effective 
local taxation would create more local revenue which local governments use for development 
purposes.  Of course in all three cases such reforms would remove power from the control of the 
central government, which is why they have drawn such little support in Kampala. 
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Table 1: District Creation in Uganda 
(Sources: Government of Uganda 1987; Ocwich 2005; US Census Bureau) 
 
Year Number of Districts Population per District 
1959 16 443,000 
1962 17 456,365 
1968 18 513,711 
1971 19 526,853 
1974 37 292,211 
1980 33 368,115 
1990 34 513,412 
1991 38 476,474 
1994 39 514,256 
1997 45 455,718 
2000 56 427,786 
2005 69 402,843 
2006 80 378,283 
2009 87 375,977 
2010 112 298,205 
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Notes 
 
2
 Much of the material in this paper dates back to a chapter of my PhD dissertation under the aegis 
of Professors Tim Allen and Teddy Brett at the LSE.  Research on this and related topics has led to 
field work in Uganda on four separate occasions, with a focus on semi-structured interviews as well 
as document collection from various government ministries and other sources. 
3
 For more on the history of these kingdoms and their lingering effects on private wealth in the 
present, see Bandyopadhyay and Green (2015). 
4
 In my own field work in the early 2000s I encountered similar sentiments from local officials in 
Masaka District in southern Buganda. 
5
 89% of unconditional grant funds are used to cover salaries and wages (Monitor 25/7/2011). 
6
 Uganda was one of the first countries in Africa to introduce equalization grants (Steffensen and 
Trollegaard 2000, p. 51). 
7
 Thus the sub-county received 65% of 65% of the total tax revenue, or 42%. 
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8
 Museveni has never actually used this right, but his explicit threats to doso in the case of Kibaale 
district in 2002 led directly to the resignation of the district chairman at the time (Green 2007). 
9
 Tigurihwayo’s dislike for local government staff could explain why the Masaka LCV executive 
council voted unanimously in favour of his transfer on December 18, 2003 (Monitor 22/12/2003); 
he was moved back out west to Ntungamo district in President Museveni’s 2003 RDC reshuffle five 
days later (New Vision 23/12/2003). 
10
 A person with an income of 32,000 Ush paid a GPT rate of 9.4% while people with incomes of 
330,000 and 1.5m Ush only paid 5.7% and 5.3%, respectively (Livingstone and Charlton 1998, 
504-505). 
11
 Chen, Matovu and Reinikka (2001, p. 277) write that "the GPT represents an expensive form of 
tax administration and, because presumptive assessment can imply subjectivity and arbitrariness, is 
often perceived as unfair."  It is partially for these reasons that other African countries have not 
allowed local governments to collect income tax (Steffensen and Trollegaard 2000, p. 48). 
12
 Sub-county chairpersons are required to have achieved a minimum of four years of secondary 
school. 
13
 About half of the village councillors I spoke to in Masaka district could not speak English. 
